Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 10

1966

Federalism as a Limitation on the Treaty Power of the United
States, West Germany, and India
F. L. Hartman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
F. L. Hartman, Federalism as a Limitation on the Treaty Power of the United States, West Germany, and
India, 18 W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 134 (1966)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol18/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

[Vol. 18: 134

Federalism as a Limitation on the
Treaty Power of the United States,
West Germany, and India
F. L. Hartman
The complexity of the world political situation and the concomitant
need for effective treaty-making powers have created problems for governments based on the federal system, one of the most perplexing of
which is how to strike a balance between the importance of a unified
front in external affairs and the desire to preserve the sovereign rights
of constituent states. Mr. Hartman examines the constitutions of three
federal governments, the United States, India, and West Germany, and
compares their approach to the problem. Although the author feels that
the organic law of the federation can provide a partial solution, he concludes that an examination of case law and internal agreement or legislation demonstrates that the most workable solution lies in self-restraint
and cooperation between the central government and its component states.

HE PROBLEMS which a federal system often creates for a national government in its conduct of foreign affairs continues to
concern jurists and students of government. An especially perplexing
question is that of how best to strike a satisfactory balance between
the increasing need for unified
federal action in external afTHB AuTHOR (B.A., University of
Iowa, LL.B., University of Michigan) is
fairs on the one hand and the
a member of the Michigan Bar Association and was a 1964-1965 Michigan
Law School fellow at the Max-PlanckInstitute for Foreign Public Law and
International Law, Heidelberg, Germany.

desire to maintain a dual sys-

of internal government on
the other.
The proposed
Bricker Amendment of 1952
tem

in the United States' and the
Lindauer Agreement of 1957 in the Federal Republic of Germany'
are but two differing examples of possible accommodation. Indeed,
it remains to be seen whether a federation can effectively participate
in modern international affairs and at the same time maintain
its internal federal character.
The primary legal question which will be explored here is the extent to which a division of authority between central government
and component states limits the power of a federation to conclude
and domestically execute international agreements. Greatest emphasis will be given to the problem as it arises in American law, and

IS.J. Res.

130, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2-3 (1952).

2 See material quoted note 83 infra.
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comparisons will be made, where appropriate, to the federations of
West Germany and India.
I.

THE TREATY POWER AS CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFINED

Although 176 years have elapsed since the ratification of the
United States Constitution and hundreds of cases involving treaties
have been litigated before the Supreme Court as well as before lower
courts, the exact scope and limits of the national treaty power remain something of a mystery. The Constitution contains three articles and one amendment which are of foremost importance in defining the treaty power.
Article II, section 2 provides that, "He [the President] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .... "
The President is thereby empowered to enter into treaties with foreign nations, contingent upon the prescribed ratification by the Senate. The House of Representatives is altogether excluded from the
treaty-making process, and the entire Congress is excluded from the
process of negotiation.
Article VI provides that "This Constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof: and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The
significance of this article is twofold: treaties are to have the status
of national law if made under the authority of the United States, and
state organic and statutory law must give way to federal treaties with
which they conflict.
The two remaining applicable constitutional provisions further
define the relationship between the states and the treaty-making
power, first, by denying any power to the states to enter into treaties
with foreign governments and, secondly, by placing powers not
delegated to the national government beyond its reach. Article I,
section 10 provides that "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation... or... shall, without the Consent of
Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power." Finally, amendment X specifies
that 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by itto the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." The meaning of the former provi-
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sion is apparent, but the effect of the tenth amendment as a limitation on the federal treaty power remains in doubt. Nevertheless,
it is clear that no aspect of the treaty-making power is reserved to
the states.
The Grundgesetz of West Germany' likewise has established a
central government of delegated powers, with the residue being reserved to the constituent states (Linder). In this respect, article 30,
GG,4 serves the same function as the tenth amendment to the
American Constitution. Although no supremacy clause for treaties
comparable to article VI of the United States Constitution is contained in the Grundgesetz, article 31 (supremacy of federal law over
Land law) together with article 59 (requiring the transformation by
legislation of most treaties into federal law) produce the same effect. The only striking contrast between the American Constitution
and the Grundgesetz in relation to the treaty power is that the latter,
in article 32, reserves a limited treaty-making power to the Linder
and requires the central government to consult particular Ldander regarding proposed treaties affecting their special interests.
As a practical matter, it is questionable whether the treatymaking power of the Lander is a significant one. In the first place,
the L.nder may not conclude treaties except with the permission of
the central government and then only in those areas in which the
Linder are competent to legislate, either concurrently or exclusively.5 The Linder are further limited by the fact that they may
neither establish consulates or diplomatic offices in foreign countries
nor receive on an established basis diplomatic representatives from
foreign nations.' In order to deal with foreign countries at all, a
Land would either have to work through the federal Foreign Ministry or establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate such treaties.
The requirement that Linder whose special interests will be affected by a treaty be consulted by the federal government likewise
does not appear to be a significant limitation upon the treaty power
3
The Grundgesetz, translated as "Basic Law," currently serves as the German constitution. It is not called a constitution because it was written and accepted by the
German states (in German, states are Liinder and are referred to in the singular as
Land) as a temporary organic law of West Germany to be replaced by a constitution at
such time as East and West Germany were reunified. The term Grundgesetz is often ab-

breviated as GG, as it will be in this article.
4
Article 30 reads as follows: "The exercise of the powers of the state and the discharge of state functions is the concern of the Lander, insofar as this Basic Law does
not otherwise prescribe or permit."
5

GG art. 32(3).
S1
MAUNz-DfTmIG, GRUNDGESEZ KoMMBNTAR art. 32, at 23-24 (1964)
ment by Maunz).

(Com-
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of the federation. This constitutional requirement is presumed to
mean only that the Land affected is to be given an opportunity to
formally express its views on the proposed treaty prior to its ratification. It does not appear to imply that the Land must give its formal
consent to the ratification or that the federation may not conclude
the treaty in the event the Land concerned opposes it.7
The Indian Constitution, in contrast to the Grundgesetz and the
United States Constitution, provides for a delegation of powers to
both the central government and the states, with the residue vested
exclusively in the former.8 Furthermore, article 253 gives the Indian Parliament the power to make any law implementing any
treaty, agreement, or any decision made at any international conference, convention, association or other body, notwithstanding the exclusive grant of some powers to the states. The Indian Constitution
leaves no doubt that the central government has plenary power to
implement treaties, as well as non-obligatory recommendations of international groups without consideration for exclusive state powers.
Similar to the Grundgesetz, Indian treaties are not automatically the
supreme law of the land until they have been transformed into federal law, and the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties is of little practical importance in contrast to the
situation in the United States.9
The Union government of India is granted the constitutional
power to enter into all types of treaties and to pass implementing
legislation which may encroach upon exclusive state powers, and
the states are thereby denied any right or power to enter into treaties
with foreign states. The constitution does not state the prohibition
in affirmative terms but simply grants all such power to the central
government with no residuum for the states. One Indian writer
7Id.

art. 30, at 8.

1, 7th schedule. See also art. 248.
There are some exceptions, however. As to some matters, India has simply followed the precedents of British law in declaring that some types of treaties are domestically enforceable even without implementing legislation. Acquisition of territories,
for example, is considered to be an act of state, and a treaty incorporating new territory
into the Union would be internally enforceable without the legislative aid of Parliament. See Union of India v. Manmull Jain, All India Rep., 1954 Calcutta 615. The
same is true of treaties by which foreign sovereigns waive their immunities. See Kunwar
Bishwanath Singh v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, 10 I.T.R. 332 (1942). On the other
hand, treaties which diminish or alter boundaries of any of the component states would
presumably, under articles 3 and 4, require implementing legislation. It should be noted
in this connection that the right and powers of the states are not limitations upon the
federal treaty-making power. The constitution, article 3, provides only that the views
of the states concerned must be first ascertained before the federal government may
alter or diminish state boundaries by treaty.
8 INDIAN CoNsT. entry 97, list
9
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compares this lack of state power to participate in the treaty-making
process with the United States system and concludes:
This [Indian denial of treaty-making power to the states] is not,
however, exactly the position under other federal constitutions.
For instance, in the United States of America, the Constitution recognizes the right of the States to conclude treaties with foreign
Powers, but this right can only be exercised with the consent of the
Federal Congress. 10
This comparative observation is, of course, incorrect. The American states are absolutely prohibited by article I, section 10, from
entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation. Since the prohibition is absolute, it may not be avoided by congressional consent.
The third clause of article I, section 10, forbids the states to enter
into agreements or compacts with other states or foreign powers,
except with the permission of Congress. The Supreme Court in
Holmes v. Jennison" reasoned that "as these words [agreement or
compact] could not have been idly or superfluously used by the
framers of the constitution, they cannot be construed to mean the
same thing with the word treaty."1 Thus, the only difference in
this regard between the American and Indian systems is that although the latter's constitution does not expressly prohibit states
from entering into treaties, both effectively foreclose the exercise
of the treaty-making power by the states.
If.

TREATY INTRUSION UPON POWERS TRADITIONALLY
EXERCISED BY THE COMPONENT STATES

Although the government of the United States is one of delegated powers, such a generalization does not tell the whole story.
The Congress, for example, may enact legislation which is "necessary
and proper" for the execution of its enumerated powers. 3 Thus, it
often occurs that subject matter formerly regulated only by the
states may come under federal regulation even though no express
grant of power to Congress to regulate the matter is to be found in
the Constitution. More notable federal invasions upon areas normally or originally regulated by the states are the following activities: punishment of crimes,'4 chartering of banks'" and corpora'0 SEN, A COMPARATVE STUDY OF THE INDiAN CONSTTUT1ON 318 (1960).
'139 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
12 Id. at 571-72.

Is U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8.
14 The most recently created crime, formerly punishable by state law only, is murder of the President. 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (Supp. I, 1965).
15McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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tions,' regulation of intrastate commerce,17 and, most recently, the
regulation of public accommodations such as restaurants, hotels, and
movie houses in order to prevent racial discrimination."8
It has been further recognized by the Supreme Court that in relation to the conduct of foreign affairs, the central government is likewise not limited to the exercise of delegated powers. Such was the
purport of Mr. Justice Sutherland's statement in United States v.
Curtiss-WrightExport Corp.19 to the following effect:
It will contribute to the elucidation of the question if we
first consider the differences between the powers of the federal
government in respect of foreign or external affairs and those
in respect of domestic or internal affairs ....
The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of
their origin and their nature. The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically
enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are
necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs ....
It results that the investment of the federal government with
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.2'
Thus, the broad proposition consistently asserted by the Supreme
Court has been that federal treaties may extend into areas of regulation and control traditionally left to the states. As stated by Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes in Santovincenzo v. Egan," 'The treatymaking power is broad enough to cover all subjects that properly
pertain to our foreign relations, and agreement with respect to the
rights and privileges of citizens of the United States in foreign countries, and of the nationals of such countries within the United States
...is within the scope of that power .... " 23 In United States v.Belmont,24 the Court asserted that "in respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear." 25 In United States v. Pink,2" Mr. Justice
U.S. 341 (1923).
17 United States v.Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
18
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 55 201-1106, 78 Stat. 243, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
1OCIalanm County v.United States, 263

2000 a-h (1964).
19299 U.S. 304 (1936).
01d. at 315-16.
211d. at 318.
2

2284 U.S. 30 (1931).
2
Id. at 40.
24301 U.S. 324 (1937).
25Id. at 331.
26315 U.S. 203 (1942).

§S
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Douglas, speaking for the Court, pointed out that "power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively. It need not be so exercised as to conform
to state laws or state policies, whether they be expressed in constitutions, statutes, or judicial decrees." 27 And finally, in the famous case
of Geofroy v.Riggs,28 Mr. Justice Field described the treaty power as
not extending
so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change
in the character of the government or in that of one of the
States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter,
without its consent. . . . But with these exceptions, it is not
perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be
adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject of
negotiation with a foreign country.29
The rule suggested by these cases can perhaps best be understood
in terms of the theory of concurrent powers. The treaty power may
extend to matters not specifically reserved to the states but which
otherwise have been left to the states as "local" matters, and when
such treaty power is exercised, contrary state laws must give way.
An interesting example of the operation of this rule is Asakura v.
City of Seattle." In that case, the city of Seattle had passed an ordinance in 1921 requiring all pawnbrokers to obtain a license which
was available to citizens of the United States only. The plaintiff, a
subject of Japan, argued that the 1911 treaty between the United
States and Japan guaranteed that citizens of either nation should
be at liberty in the territory of the other to engage in all classes of
trade and that this treaty took precedence over the Seattle ordinance.
In accepting the plaintiff's argument, the United States Supreme
Court observed:
In this country, the practice of pledging personal property for
loans dates back to early colonial times, and pawnshops have been
regulated by state laws for more than a century. We have found
no state legislation abolishing or forbidding the business. Most,
if not all, of the States provide for licensing pawnbrokers and
authorize regulation by municipalities. While regulation has been
found necessary in the public interest, the business is not on that

account to be excluded from the trade and commerce referred to
in the treaty. 3 '
2

7Id. at 233.

28

2

133 U.S. 258 (1890).

9Id.

at 267.

30265 U.S. 332 (1924).

311d. at 343.
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Thus, by exercise of the treaty power, the federal government may
regulate alien land holdings within any of the states,"2 employment
of aliens,' protection of migratory birds," as well as inheritance
taxes upon aliens, 5 and the rights of alien creditors against United
States citizens8 8 These are matters which one might say were always possible subjects of treaties and which were regulated locally
until international considerations necessitated regulation on an international level. As suggested by Professor Henkin, if, before the
conclusion of a treaty, this type of subject matter is left to the states
to regulate, it is only a "defeasible" power, "subject at any time to
the assertion of the federal interest by treaty, just as in some other
power the States may act in the absence of federal
areas of federal
37
regulation.
In American federalism, as in perhaps most federal systems,
there is a tendency on the part of the constituent states to jealously
guard their presumed rights and powers against federal encroachment, particularly whenever ambiguity exists as to where federal
power ends and state power begins. Ambiguity has arisen in American law as the result of two factors: first, the constitutional doctrine
that the central government may regulate otherwise local matters
when necessary to carry out its dearly defined powers and, second,
the difficulty of distinguishing between the powers reserved to the
states by the Constitution and the powers actually exercised by the
states in the absence of federal legislation. The latter powers were,
of course, originally much broader than the constitutionally reserved
powers. And from the point of view of the states, all the powers
which they have actually exercised at one time or another ought to be
recognized as constitutionally reserved powers. Obviously, such is
not the case.
The Indian Constitution presents no significant problems along
this line, since the constituent states possess no powers other than
those enumerated in the constitution, and those so enumerated may
unquestionably be invaded by the central government for purposes
of concluding and implementing treaties and non-obligatory international recommendations.
32 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
83 In re Parrot, 1 Fed. 481 (CC. Cal. 1880).
34 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
35

Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
6Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 199 (1796).
37
Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and
ForeignRelations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 909 (1959).
3
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The Grundgesetz would likewise appear to present no serious
problems of this kind. The Federal Parliament has not been recognized as possessing any implied powers capable of invading the competence of the Linder other than the very limited and still doubtful
powers arising from the concepts of Sachzusammenhang and Natur
der Sache3 Theoretically, it is perhaps possible that in the future
these two notions might be utilized by the German Constitutional
Court to recognize implied powers of Parliament to implement
treaties by invading some of the lesser or questionably reserved legislative powers of the Linder, but the seventeen years of German
experience with the Grundgesetz does not yet afford an adequate
basis for prediction.
III.

RESERVED POWERS OF THE STATES AS A LIMITATION
ON THE FEDERAL TREATY POWER

Although it appears settled in America that the treaty power
may invade areas normally controlled by the constituent states, the
question remains as to which, if any, of the constitutional limitations
upon the central government are also applicable to the treaty power.
If any are applicable, is the tenth amendment among them?
The problem may be approached from two directions. One
might ask whether the treaty power is limited only to matters which
the central government may expressly or impliedly regulate. Or one
might question whether there are any reserved state powers which
may not be encroached upon either by Congress or by the treaty
power. In either approach the basic problem for determination is
what relationship the Constitution bears to the treaty power. The
difficulty arises from article VI of the Constitution which indicates
what shall be the "supreme law of the land." The article lists
three categories of supreme law - the Constitution itself, laws of
the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution, and treaties
made under the authority of the United States. Article VI suggests
that whereas the laws of the United States must be "constitutional"
in order to be supreme, treaties need only be made by authority of
the United States and, by implication, are not subject to the constitutional limitations applicable to the laws of the United States. It
is generally recognized, however, that the Constitution stands at the
38 For a discussion of these concepts, see Judgment of June 16, 1954, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 3 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 407 (Ger. Fed. Rep.);
1 MAuNz-DORIG, op. cit. supra note 6, art. 30, at 8-9. For a discussion in English, see
Kauper, The Constitutions of West Germany and the United States: A Comparative
Study, 58 M CH. L. REV. 1091, 1143 (1960).
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pinnacle of the legal system and that no other form of domestic or
international law is accorded a higher or even an equal municipal
status. Accordingly, there is no question of whether the treaty
power may override the Constitution. Rather, the question is
whether the treaty power is exempted from any of the constitutional
limitations otherwise imposed upon the central government, and
if so, which ones.
Of the hundreds of treaties subjected to judicial review by the
Supreme Court, none has ever been found unconstitutional.
Whether this indicates the great breadth of the treaty-making power
or simply the past cautiousness of the President and Senate in ratifying only those treaties free of constitutional defects is impossible to
determine. Yet because the high Court has not declared a treaty
unconstitutional, no one can be certain exactly what such a treaty
looks like. The American jurist has only dicta to rely upon in estimating the bounds of the treaty power, for the Supreme Court has
thus far only broadly and hypothetically stated what the limits are.
The only limit suggested in the cases is that treaties must observe
constitutional prohibitions: "The prohibitions of the Constitution
were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government
and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and
the Senate combined." 9 Is the tenth amendment one of these prohibitions, and, if so, what powers does the tenth amendment reserve
exclusively to the states and thereby place beyond the reach of the
treaty power?
Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court in United States v.
Sprague,4" suggests that the tenth amendment taken alone has no
constitutional significance: "The Tenth Amendment was intended to
confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution
was adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as originally ratified .... ."
Professor Corwin reaches a similar conclusion:
That this provision was not conceived to be a yardstick for
measuring the powers granted to the Federal Government or reserved to the States was dearly indicated by its sponsor, James
Madison, in the course of the debate which took place while the
amendment was pending concerning Hamilton's proposal to establish a national bank. He declared that: "Interference with the
39

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
40282 U.S. 716 (1931).
41
1d. at 733.
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power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the power of
Congress. If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise
it; if given, they might exercise it, although it should interfere
'
with the laws, or even the Constitutions of the States."4

The Supreme Court's view of the tenth amendment has been
slow in evolving and has been greatly influenced by the exigencies
of national life. Beginning in 1871, the Court first utilized the
amendment as an independent limitation upon the federal government to nullify otherwise constitutional acts of Congress. 43 Beginning in 1918 and for two decades thereafter, the Court found in the
amendment prohibitions with respect to the federal government's
regulation of economic activities."
It was not until the depression of the 1930's proved the necessity for national action that the
Court began to take a new and less sympathetic look at the tenth
amendment. By 1941, the Court had fully reversed itself so that
Mr. Chief Justice Stone, supported by a unanimous Court, was able
with one stroke to snuff out most if not all of the earlier vitality of
the tenth amendment by describing it as "a truism that all is retained
'
which has not been surrendered."45
This constitutional development, of course, involved only the
struggle between the powers of the states and those of the Congress
and not the conflict between states and the treaty power. However,
since the treaty-making power is no less broad than the powers of
Congress, what was said by the Court of the tenth amendment in relation to congressional powers is equally applicable to the treaty
power.
Further, the much-discussed case of Missouri v. Holland4 6 at
1035 (Small ed. 1964).
Collector v. Day, 17 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
44
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44
(1922); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
45
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
46252 U.S. 416 (1920).
The facts of the case are, summarily, as follows: In
1913, Congress passed the first Migratory Birds Act, 37 Stat. 847 (1913), to give national protection to certain wild game birds which, because of their semiannual migration from state to state, could not be protected by the laws of any one state. The act
provided that "migratory game... which... do not remain permanently the entire
year within the borders of any State or Territory, shall hereafter be deemed to be within
the custody and protection of the government of the United States, and shall not be
destroyed or taken contrary to regulations" to be made by the Department of Agriculture. Ibid. The act was held invalid in two lower federal courts on the ground that
the power sought to be exercised had never been delegated by the states or people and
therefore remained a tenth amendment reserved power. United States v. Shauver, 214
Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914); United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915).
In 1916, a treaty between the United States and Great Britain, acting on behalf of Can42 CONSTTUTON OF THE UNITED STATEs OF AMERIcA,
43
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least implied that the treaty power is even broader than the powers
of Congress and that although the tenth amendment may stand
generally as a limitation upon the implied powers of Congress to
enact purely domestic legislation, it is not a limitation on the implied powers of Congress to implement treaties. As Mr. Justice
Holmes indicated in the opinion, "It is obvious that there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an
act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by
such an act could ... ."' It is significant to note that this opinion
was premised upon two assumptions. First, Holmes assumed without deciding that because of the tenth amendment, Congress did not
have the power to regulate migratory birds in the absence of a
treaty on this subject. Secondly, Holmes hypothesized that a matter of national gravity could arise with which Congress would be
powerless to deal, other than in pursuance of a ratified treaty. In
view of the subsequent development of constitutional law, it is highly doubtful that either assumption would be warranted today. As
has been pointed out earlier, beginning in the late 1930's, the Supreme Court has steadily liberalized its view of the implied powers
of Congress, particularly when faced with "national exigencies," and
at the same time has become increasingly cautious in giving any
substantive meaning to the tenth amendment as a general limitation
upon the central government. Indeed, there are jurists today who
assert that the powers of Congress are every bit as broad as the
treaty-making powers of the President and Senate.48
One should not conclude, however, that the foregoing indicates
that the states are totally unprotected from intrusion upon their
powers by treaties. There are cases suggesting specific limitations
upon the right of the treaty power to invade the jurisdiction of the
49 state
states. In Patsone v. Commissioner of Pa.,
law denied an
Italian citizen residing in Pennsylvania the right to carry firearms
despite his argument that he was a farmer who needed to have a gun
and that the statute violated a treaty provision permitting Italians
ada, was ratified in order to provide international protection of migratory birds. The Migratory Birds Act was again enacted by Congress in 1918 with a few incidental changes,
this time as legislation implementing a treaty, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 40 Star. 755
(1918), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (1964). The state of Missouri brought a
bill in equity against the United States game warden to prevent enforcement of the act.
47 252 -U.S. at 433.
48 For an interesting development of this thesis, see Henkin, The Treaty Makers
and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
903 (1959).
49232 U.S. 138 (1914).
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the freedom to carry on trade on the same terms as American citizens. The state law was upheld on the basis that a state has the
right to protect its wild game for its own citizens if it wishes and
that there was nothing in the treaty contrary to the right of the state
to make such regulations.5"
Further, according to Professor Hendry, in Lubetich v.Pollack5 l
and Leong Mow v. Board of Comm'rs,2 "there is support for the
proposition that the regulation of this type of state property [commercial fishing] is within the control of the state, and may not be
touched by the treaty process.""4
54 the question arose as to
In Magnani v. Harnett,
whether or not
a New York statute limiting issuance of chauffeurs' licenses to citizens and those who have officially declared an intention to become
citizens was in conflict with the reciprocal "trade and occupation"
treaty with Great Britain. The Supreme Court of Albany County
held:
There does not seem, however, in the case at hand, to be the question of "occupation" or "trade" involved. Rather the question is
one of the granting of a "privilege!' to operate motor vehicles upon
the public thoroughfares of New York State. This is clearly an
exercise of the police power, the proper enforcement of which cannot be abrogated by an international treaty, it 55being purely a question within the province of the several States.
The Albany court's holding was reversed by the appellate division, "
and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that
the statute was in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 7
The federal circuit court case of In re Wong Yung Qay," offers
the following dicta: "[Ilt may well be questioned whether the
treaty-making power would extend to the protection of practices,
under the guise of religious sentiment, deleterious to the public
5o Id.at 145-46.
516 F.2d 237 (W.D. Wash. 1925).
52185 Fed. 223 (CC.D. L.a. 1911).
53

113 (1955).
169 Misc. 697, 8 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. 1938), rev'd per curiam, 257 App.
Div. 487, 14 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1939), af'd, 282 N.Y. 619, 25 NxE.2d 395, cert. denied,
310 U.S. 642 (1940).
55 ld. at 6982 8 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
56bagnani v. Harnett, 257 App. Div. 487, 14 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1939), aff'd, 282
N.Y. 619, 25 N.E.2d 395, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 642 (1940).
5Magnani v. HarnMett, 282 N.Y. 619, 25 N.E.2d 395, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 642
(1940).
58 2 Fed. 624 (C.C. Cal. 1880).
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health or morals, or to a subject-matter within the acknowledged
police power of the state."59
All of these cases, however, are of dubious validity. First, with
the exception of Patsone and Magnani, they are lower federal court
opinions. Second, much of their significance is lost in the fact that
each of the cases upheld state statutes based on the police powers by
holding the statutes not to be in conflict with the treaties asserted
against them. Finally, in each case, the court found that the treaty
in question did not, in its language or intent, attempt to establish a
rule of law in opposition to the state statute. Some scholars, particularly Professor Hendry, argue that such interpretations have tended
to do violence to the intent of the treaties and that "such restrictive
interpretations represent a circuitous reasoning encouraged by poor
or indefinite treaty-drafting rather than any illustration of the reserve power in the states."'
It remains interesting speculation, however, as to what the Supreme Court might do with a factual situation similar to that of
Magnani if the treaty had specifically stated that subjects of Great
Britain living in the United States were to be granted motor vehicle
licenses on the same basis as citizens of the American state in which
the British subject resided. Or suppose the treaty provided that an
international driver's license held by a British subject residing in the
United States would be honored for a period of six months after the
subject entered the country. Speculation would favor the upholding
of the treaty provision as against contrary state laws on the basis
that this was a proper subject of international negotiation, that the
treaty provision did not violate a specific constitutional prohibition,
and that the power to license persons to operate vehicles on public
streets was not reserved exclusively to the states. However, the
question would be a difficult one since the states to date have exercised this power almost exclusively and are considered to be the proprietary owners of the state highways within their boundaries.
A judicial device for the protection of state powers in relationship to treaties is the policy of the Supreme Court to construe
treaties, whenever reasonably possible, so that they do not come
into conflict with state laws, although the Court has been less than
consistent in the application of this policy."' In United States v.
59 Id. at 632.
60 HENDRBY, op. cit. supra note 53, at 112.
61
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938), the Court indicated that "even the language of a treaty wherever reasonably possible will be con-
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Pink,62 Mr. Justice Douglas noted that "it is, of course, true that
even treaties with foreign nations will be carefully construed so as
not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the States of
this nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy.' '" On the other hand, some years prior to these two cases, the
Court asserted that treaties will be liberally interpreted and that "as
the treaty-making power is independent of and superior to the
legislative power of the states, the meaning of treaty provisions so
construed is not restricted by any necessity of avoiding possible conflict with state legislation ... "64 These statements can perhaps be
reconciled by paraphrasing them as follows: the judiciary is not obligated to construe treaties so as to avoid conflict with state statutes,
but it will do so whenever it seems appropriate and reasonable.
To summarize the present status of American law, it is this
writer's opinion that the tenth amendment no longer constitutes a
restriction upon the treaty-making power. A state may not expect
to win its case before the Supreme Court if it opposes a ratified
treaty on the ground that it invades powers reserved to the states
under the tenth amendment. In relation to state power, the only
restrictions upon treaty making by the central government which
appear to be commonly recognized are those stated in Geofroy v.
Riggs,6" that the treaty power does not extend so far as to authorize
a change in the character of the government "of one of the States,
or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its
consent."6 6 It is significant to note, as has Professor Corwin, that
"The reserved rights of the States have never received vindication in
a single decision of the Supreme Court of the United States pronouncing a treaty of the United States unconstitutional because of
its operation within the field of power which ordinarily belongs to
the States."6 7
If the tenth amendment may not be used to maintain a tolerable
balance between the objective of maintaining a division of power
along federal and state lines and the necessity of having a central
government powerful enough to deal effectively in external affairs,
strued so as not to override state laws or to impair rights arising under them."
143.
62315 U.S. 203 (1942).
63 ld. at 230.

Neilsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929).
65 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
66
Id.at 267.
67
CORWIN,NATIONAL SUPREMACY 300 (1913).
64

Id. at
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then what protection, if any, do the states have? Protection is suggested in Missouri v. Holland" where the importance of traditional
state powers was weighed against the need for invading these powers
by treaty. Professor Quincy Wright has suggested that the maintenance of a modicum of power in the states could be assured by
application of the following test to treaties: "The immunity from
treaty interference of certain State powers can only be sustained by
showing that they cover a subject-matter inherently inappropriate
for treaty negotiation."69 Thus, by this test, the question is not
whether the treaty invades a power reserved to the states, but
whether the treaty embraces a matter irrelevant to foreign affairs.
Secretary of State Root had made the same observation in maintaining:
It is, of course, conceivable that, under pretense of exercising the
treaty-making power, the president and senate might attempt to
make provisions regarding matters which are not proper subjects
of international agreement, and which would be only a colorable
- not a real - exercise of the treaty-making power; but so far as
the real exercise of the power goes, there can be no question of
state rights, because the constitution itself, in the most explicit
terms, has precluded the existence of any such question. 70
The view expressed by Arthur K. Kuhn is likewise instructive
71
and went far to anticipate the outcome of Missouri v. Holland:
"International, not municipal standards of law should determine its
7
scope [the treaty-making poweri and the limitations of its use." 1
Hence, when local matters extend themselves into the affairs of nations so that international cooperation is required, they then become
proper subjects of treaties.
Much potential controversy over the reserved powers of the
states in relation to the treaty power is usually anticipated and
allayed by federal treaty makers either by drafting the treaty so that
it is conditional upon applicable state laws or by simply excluding
certain subjects from treaties. As pointed out by Bowie and Fried78
rich:

68252 U.S. 416 (1920).
69

Wright, The Constitutionality of Treaties, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 258 (1919).
Root, The Real Questions Under the Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco
School Board Resolution, 1 AM. J. INT'L L 273, 279 (1907).
71252 U.S. 416 (1920).
72
Kuhn, The Treaty-making Power and the Reserved Sovereignty of the States,
7 COLum. L. REv. 172, 185 (1907).
73
STUDIES IN FEDERAISM (Bowie & Friedrich ed. 1954).
70
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The federal government has proceeded rather cautiously in
other fields [than those in which the treaty power has already been
upheld]; e.g., despite the broad federal powers in labor matters derived from the commerce clause of the Constitution, it has
refused to ratify almost all international labor conventions on the
ground that they74 deal with subjects which belong to an area reserved to States.
Although perhaps politically expedient, it is highly doubtful that

such cautiousness is legally necessary. As stated in United States v.
Belmont,75 "in respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear. ' '76 It is thus difficult to avoid the conclusion that in
its relations with foreign nations, the United States is represented,
for all practical purposes, by a unitary rather than a federal government.

77

The development which has taken place in the Federal Republic
of Germany is noteworthy for comparison purposes.78 First, the
central government has no power to legislate in matters other than
those over which the Grundgesetz has given the federation specific
74 Id. at 253.
75 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
76Id. at 331.
77

As is well known, Senator Bricker introduced resolutions in the United States
Senate in 1952 to amend the Constitution by placing certain limitations upon the
treaty-making power. See S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2-3 (1952). On the
basis of Senator Bricker's efforts, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out a resolution which provided that treaties in conflict with the Constitution are invalid, that a
treaty becomes internal law only through legislation which would be valid without the
treaty, and that Congress shall have the power to regulate all executive and other agreements with foreign powers or international organizations. The initial provision would
appear to be a statement of the obvious; the second was an attempt to negate the implications or dicta of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), that Congress might pass
legislation in aid of a treaty which ithad no power to enact in the absence of such a
treaty. (See Henkin, supra note 48 for the view that the powers of Congress are as
large in scope as the treaty-making power.) The third provision was an attempt to bring
executive agreements under the watchful eye and within the control of Congress. The
entire discussion and movement to restrict the treaty power and particularly the foreign
relations powers of the President arose from controversy as to the constitutionality of
the United States becoming a party to the draft of the International Covenant on Human Rights prepared by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. One of
the unfortunate aspects of this movement was the fact that the American Bar Association
had early in the public debate lent its prestige to a proposed constitutional amendment
similar to the Bricker proposal.
The Senate Judiciary Committee resolution was debated during January and February of 1954, was amended to delete the provision granting Congress the power to
regulate executive agreements but failed by one vote to receive the necessary two-thirds
majority approval of the Senate. See 100 CONG.REc. 2349-58, 2364-75 (1954).
78 For excellent discussions of the effects of federalism on the treaty power in Germany, see BERNHARDT, DER ABSCHLUSS VOLxKRE CHTLICHER VERTRAGE IM BUNDESSTAAT (1957) and Mosler, Kulturabkommen des Bundesstaats, 16 ZHrrscHuFT
FfR AUSLNDISCHES OFFBqTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 1 (1955).
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exclusive or concurrent legislative power 9 Further, no implied
power is granted by the Grundgesetz which would permit the central
government to legislate in areas in which it had neither exclusive
nor concurrent legislative powers. If, therefore, the federation condudes a treaty requiring internal legislation which the Llinder alone
are competent to enact, the federation may not invade these powers
and attempt to legislatively implement the treaty itself. In such a
case, the federation would have to rely upon the Linder to enact the
legislation, but could not force the Linder to do so, even under the
doctrine of Bundestreue.s As stated by Professor Maunz, "If a
concurrent treaty competence in the area of Land legislation were
to fall to the federation, these treaties could be legislatively fulfilled
only by the Linder."'
This dear-cut division of legislative power between the federation and the L' nder has created problems for the treaty-making
power. A somewhat unique solution was devised in 1957, although
whether it constitutes a permanent solution remains open to question. Known as the Lindauer Agreement' 2 and concluded between
the federation and the Linder, the document provides that the
Lnder will permit treaty invasion upon their reserved powers under certain specific circumstances.' The legal status of the agreement presently seems to be unclear.84
79 GG arts. 70-75.
801 MAUNZ-DfjRIG, GRUNDGESErz KOMMENTAR 13 (1964)

(comment by
Maunz). The term Bundestreue is perhaps best translated as "loyalty to the Federation."
81 bid. [translated by the author].
OFMNTLICHIS RE= UND V6LKM82 20 ZMTSCaRUT PUR AUSL&EISCHI
RECHT (1960).
83

Because of the uniqueness of this agreement, the author takes the liberty here of
giving the text of the agreement as the author has translated from the German in 20
ZrITScHRIFT FOR AUSLNDiSCHES OFBENTLIcHES REcHT UND V6LKERRCHT 116-17
n.102.

1. The Federation and Lander adhere to their proclaimed legal opinions
as to the power to conclude and transform international treaties concerning
subjects within the exclusive competence of the Under.
2. The Linder consider cooperation to be possible in respect to the application of Articles 73 (1) and (5) and 74(4) of the Grundgesetz:
A competence of the Federation could, on this basis, be recognized, for
example, for
A. Consular treaties,
B. Trade and navigation treaties, treaties concerning the right of
establishment and treaties concerning traffic in goods and currency.
C. Treaties concerning the entrance into or establishment of international organizations; also insofar as these treaties contain provisions
which it is possibly doubtful whether within the framework of an international treaty, they fall within the exclusive legislative competence
of the Under, when these provisions
a) are typical for such treaties and are usually contained in these
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It would appear then that, for the most part, there is no constitutional basis in German law by means of which the federation
might invade the reserved powers of the Linder as is the case in
the United States and that the only effective way to overcome this
limitation in specific instances is for the federation to obtain the
prior consent of the Linder to specific invasions.
In India, if any problem at all arises as to the relationship between the treaty-making power and the division of authority between the states and the federation, it is one of how to prevent the
treaty power from being used in non-treaty matters to reduce the
states to mere administrative subdivisions of the central government.
The problem arises from the language of article 253 which provides
that the Union Parliament has the power to make any law imtreaties or b) make up a subordinate part of the treaty, the main
part of which is free of doubt in the matter of the competence of the
Federation.
In this category belong provisions concerning privileges of foreign states
and international institutions regarding tax, police, and expropriation
law (immunities) as well as the further definition of the rights of foreigners in trade, navigation, and the right of establishment.
3. The conclusion of state treaties which, according to the opinion of
the Lander, touch upon their exclusive powers and which are not based upon
the power of the Federation according to paragraph 2, and in particular cultural agreements, shall be effected as follows:
"So far as international treaties in the areas of the exclusive power of the
Lander shall establish an obligation upon the Federation or the Under,
the consent of the Lander [to the treaty] shall be obtained. This consent shall be submitted prior to the time when the obligation will become binding under international law. In case the Federal Government transmits such a treaty to the Bundesrat according to Article 59
(2), GG, it will, at the latest, simultaneously request the consent of the
Lander. For treaties listed in paragraph 1, sentence 1, the Under shall
participate in the preparation of the treaty in good time and in any case
prior to the final determination of the treaty text."
4. It is further agreed that for treaties touching upon essential interests
of the Under, whether they concern the exclusive competence of the Lander
or not,

1. the Under will be informed concerning the proposed conclusion
of such treaties in good time so that they may promptly make their
wishes known,
2. a standing committee consisting of Uander representatives will be
established to be at the disposal of the Foreign Office or other competent specialized department of the Federation during the period of the
negotiation of international treaties as a discussion participant,
3. the agreement according to paragraph 3 is not to be affected
through the information of the committee and the statements given by it.
5. The special case of Article 32 (2), GG, is not covered by paragraph 4.
84
Maunz in 1 MAUNZ-DiTRIG, op. cit. supra note 80, at 17 suggests only that the
agreement "is to be regarded as legally valid." BERNHARDT, op. cit. supra note 78, at
180 indicates that where the special position of authority in foreign affairs is concerned,
which requires that the federation appear unified, there is no doubt that the federation is to be permitted to conclude treaties concerning subjects reserved to the Lnder
if the Lnder give their consent.
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plementing any treaty or "any decision made at any international
conference, association or other body." Certainly, no legislature
could ask for a broader power than this. One wonders whether an
international association or body might make a decision concerning
a domestic Indian matter and, by its decision, in effect confer new
powers upon the Indian Parliament to infringe upon otherwise purely internal matters, over which power of regulation is expressly
given to the states by the constitution. One writer makes an interesting comment as to this possibility:
This Last phrase [of article 253] is remarkably vague. It does
not specifically refer to conferences, associates and other bodies
representing Governments, and on its face it would seem to apply
to any international organization representing, let us say, universities or trade unions. Nor would it seem to matter that the organization had merely advisory powers. The word "decision" cannot
mean a binding decision, for the assumption is that legislation is
needed to implement it. If this is the correct interpretation the
Union Parliament can acquire jurisdiction over university education by the simple process of a decision of the Inter-University
Board of India, which is an international body because it contains
representatives of universities in Burma and Ceylon. This is such
a startling
invasion of States' rights ... that one doubts its correct85
nesS.

Perhaps for reasons of political expediency, as is sometimes the
case with United States treaty-making, the Indian government has in
the past shown restraint in treaty matters likely to infringe upon
state powers. Professor Rao notes that the Indian government has,
on previous occasions, refused to issue decrees implementing treaties
when such decrees would conflict with state legislation in an area
reserved to state competence. For example, the government refused
to decree that French university degrees would have the same
recognition in India as degrees from Indian universities in pursuance
of article 25 of the Treaty of Cession of the French Territories in
India. The Indian universities are autonomous bodies under state
laws. Further, contends Professor Rao, the government would not
for political reasons compel the states to accept French university
degrees as equivalent for purposes of recruitment into the civil services of the states because of article 309 of the constitution which
grants power to the states to regulate recruitment and conditions of
public service. "
85 JENNINGS, SOME CHARAcrmuSTiCS OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTON 65 (1953).
86 Rao, Some Problems of Intenmationad Law in India, 6 INDIAN Y. B. INT'L AFFAIRS

3, 36 (1957).
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EFFECT OF A TREATY UPON CONFLICTING
STATE LAWS

The problem of the possible collision between the laws of the
constituent states and a treaty or legislation implementing a treaty,
has been provided for and avoided in all three of the federations
under consideration. In all three, some form of supremacy clause
is contained in the organic law. In German law, a treaty and its
implementing legislation nullifies conflicting Land law only when
the treaty and implementing acts concern subjects over which the
federation has exclusive or concurrent legislative power. In the
United States and India, the supremacy of treaty law is not so
limited. Some scholars have contended that in American law
treaties are not supreme to conflicting state statutes when the latter
concern subjects within the reserved powers of the states. Henry
Tucker, for example, presented the thesis that the Supreme Court
has never invalidated such conflicting state laws but has instead
found the treaties dealing with the status of aliens residing in the
states, so often judicially reviewed by the Court, not in conflict
with the state statutes. He suggested that in Chirac v. ChiracT
and Geofroy v. Riggs,"8 the treaties merely conferred the status of
citizenship upon the aliens involved so that they were no longer
subject to the state laws dealing with inheritance by aliens.' Tucker
argued that the treaties operated analogously to marriage ceremonies in that the marriage brings the bride within the line of
inheritance under state law, whereas prior to that time she could not
demand the benefit of such inheritance laws. The difficulty with this
analogy is that in the case of the bride, her status is completely
changed because of an act performed by a state official under laws
recognizing and giving effect to the ceremony. But in the case of
the alien, he does not become a citizen of either the nation or the
state in which he resides by virtue of the treaty. Instead, the treaty
confers a privilege upon him as to the inheritance of property; a
privilege which the state laws had denied to him. The view taken by
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the Chirac case seems dear: '"The act
of Maryland has no particular reference to the case of Chirac, but is a
general rule of State policy prescribing the terms on which French
subjects may take and hold lands. This rule is changed by the treaty;
8715
88 133
8

U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).
U.S. 258 (1890).

9 TtUcER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 188-92 (1913).
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and it seems to the court that the new rule applies to all cases...."90
As early as 1797, in Ware v.Hylton,91 the Supreme Court went
to great pains to point out that a treaty may not only repeal conflicting state laws but may nullify them as well so as to destroy the
legal effect of acts done under the state law during its existence and
before the repeal.
Notwithstanding Professor Tucker's thesis, there has never been
any serious doubt about the matter, particularly in this century. The
rule was clearly reaffirmed by Mr. Justice Douglas in United States
v.Pink 2 in the following terms:
But state law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs
the policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an international compact or agreement.... Then, the power of a State to refuse enforcement of rights based on foreign law which runs counter to the

public policy of the forum ...must give way before the superior

Federal policy evidenced by a treaty or international compact or
agreement.9 3
V.

CONCLUSION

The problem of the effect on the treaty-making power of a twofold'distribution of power between component states and central
government has received varying treatment. The most effective
solution to the problem is evidenced in the Indian Constitution,
which, by express language, completely eliminates the division of
power. The United States Constitution, the oldest of the three constitutional documents considered, was neither conceived nor written
with the modern problems of treaty-making in mind. Nevertheless, because the Constitution established a general framework of government without going into great detail, the judiciary has been able
to interpret the document so that many potential "federal" problems
of treaty-making have been averted. This generality of the American Constitution is in marked contrast to the constitutional documents of West Germany and India.
The Grundgesetz, although written at a time when its authors
had the advantage of being acquainted with present-day treaty problems, reflects what might be called the historical German approach
to the problem. In many respects, its treatment of the treaty power
is similar to that of the Weimar Constitution of 1919, and repre90 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 275 (1817).
913 U.S. (3 Dat) 199 (1797).
92 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
93
d. at 230-31.

(Emphasis added.)
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sents a concession to the historically independent spirit of the
German states. Furthermore, the Grundgesetz is potentially the
most problematic of the three, at least theoretically, in its recognition
of the right of the component states to make treaties and carry on
relations with foreign states.
But the law governing a federation, particularly its constitutional law, must be considered in light of the prevailing practices
which give it its fullest meaning. For example, as a practical matter,
the United States government has thus far managed to avoid many
of the difficulties of treaty infringement upon state powers by cautiously drafting its treaties with such problems in mind and by
tacitly recognizing that the states exercise some powers which should
not be encroached upon by treaty. In the Federal Republic, it is
doubtful that many of the Lander will encounter situations which
require or suggest to them that they enter into formal treaties with
foreign states. Likewise, when the conclusion of treaties dealing
with subjects reserved to the Liinder is necessary at the federal level,
the device of formal agreements between Lnder and the federation
to permit such treaties offers at least a functional solution. And in
India, the Union government, despite its broad treaty powers, has
exercised restraint in administering treaties internally so as not to
bring the legislative competence of the states into question.
Thus, in the final analysis, the problem is only partly one of
what the organic law of a federation specifically provides in balancing the treaty power with rights of the states. Of equal importance is the degree to which the federation and constituent states are
able to find a basis of cooperation for their mutual benefit.

